Volume Security

This topic provides a general guide on pod security as it relates to volume security. For information on pod-level security in general, see Managing Security Context Constraints (SCC) and the Security Context Constraint concept topic. For information on the OpenShift Container Platform persistent volume (PV) framework in general, see the Persistent Storage concept topic.

Accessing persistent storage requires coordination between the cluster and/or storage administrator and the end developer. The cluster administrator creates PVs, which abstract the underlying physical storage. The developer creates pods and, optionally, PVCs, which bind to PVs, based on matching criteria, such as capacity.

Multiple persistent volume claims (PVCs) within the same project can bind to the same PV. However, once a PVC binds to a PV, that PV cannot be bound by a claim outside of the first claim’s project. If the underlying storage needs to be accessed by multiple projects, then each project needs its own PV, which can point to the same physical storage. In this sense, a bound PV is tied to a project. For a detailed PV and PVC example, see the guide for WordPress and MySQL using NFS.

For the cluster administrator, granting pods access to PVs involves:

Group IDs, the user ID, and SeLinux values are defined in the SecurityContext section in a pod definition. Group IDs are global to the pod and apply to all containers defined in the pod. User IDs can also be global, or specific to each container. Four sections control access to volumes:

SCCs influence whether or not a pod is given a default user ID, fsGroup ID, supplemental group ID, and SeLinux label. They also influence whether or not IDs supplied in the pod definition (or in the image) will be validated against a range of allowable IDs. If validation is required and fails, then the pod will also fail.

SCCs define strategies, such as runAsUser, supplementalGroups, and fsGroup. These strategies help decide whether the pod is authorized. Strategy values set to RunAsAny are essentially stating that the pod can do what it wants regarding that strategy. Authorization is skipped for that strategy and no OpenShift Container Platform default is produced based on that strategy. Therefore, IDs and SeLinux labels in the resulting container are based on container defaults instead of OpenShift Container Platform policies.

For a quick summary of RunAsAny:

For these reasons, SCCs with RunAsAny for ID-related strategies should be protected so that ordinary developers do not have access to the SCC. On the other hand, SCC strategies set to MustRunAs or MustRunAsRange trigger ID validation (for ID-related strategies), and cause default values to be supplied by OpenShift Container Platform to the container when those values are not supplied directly in the pod definition or image.

SCCs may define the range of allowed IDs (user or groups). If range checking is required (for example, using MustRunAs) and the allowable range is not defined in the SCC, then the project determines the ID range. Therefore, projects support ranges of allowable ID. However, unlike SCCs, projects do not define strategies, such as runAsUser.

Allowable ranges are helpful not only because they define the boundaries for container IDs, but also because the minimum value in the range becomes the default value for the ID in question. For example, if the SCC ID strategy value is MustRunAs, the minimum value of an ID range is 100, and the ID is absent from the pod definition, then 100 is provided as the default for this ID.

As part of pod admission, the SCCs available to a pod are examined (roughly, in priority order followed by most restrictive) to best match the requests of the pod. Setting a SCC’s strategy type to RunAsAny is less restrictive, whereas a type of MustRunAs is more restrictive. All of these strategies are evaluated. To see which SCC was assigned to a pod, use the oc get pod command:

It may not be immediately obvious which SCC was matched by a pod, so the command above can be very useful in understanding the UID, supplemental groups, and SeLinux relabeling in a live container.

Any SCC with a strategy set to RunAsAny allows specific values for that strategy to be defined in the pod definition (and/or image). When this applies to the user ID (runAsUser) it is prudent to restrict access to the SCC to prevent a container from being able to run as root.

Because pods often match the restricted SCC, it is worth knowing the security this entails. The restricted SCC has the following characteristics:

The following shows the default project and a custom SCC (my-custom-scc), which summarizes the interactions of the SCC and the project:

Two formats are supported for allowed ranges:

Supplemental groups are regular Linux groups. When a process runs in Linux, it has a UID, a GID, and one or more supplemental groups. These attributes can be set for a container’s main process. The supplementalGroups IDs are typically used for controlling access to shared storage, such as NFS and GlusterFS, whereas fsGroup is used for controlling access to block storage, such as Ceph RBD and iSCSI.

The OpenShift Container Platform shared storage plug-ins mount volumes such that the POSIX permissions on the mount match the permissions on the target storage. For example, if the target storage’s owner ID is 1234 and its group ID is 5678, then the mount on the host node and in the container will have those same IDs. Therefore, the container’s main process must match one or both of those IDs in order to access the volume.

For example, consider the following NFS export.

On an OpenShift Container Platform node:

On the NFS server:

The /opt/nfs/ export is accessible by UID 1000100001 and the group 5555. In general, containers should not run as root. So, in this NFS example, containers which are not run as UID 1000100001 and are not members the group 5555 will not have access to the NFS export.

Often, the SCC matching the pod does not allow a specific user ID to be specified, thus using supplemental groups is a more flexible way to grant storage access to a pod. For example, to grant NFS access to the export above, the group 5555 can be defined in the pod definition:

All containers in the above pod (assuming the matching SCC or project allows the group 5555) will be members of the group 5555 and have access to the volume, regardless of the container’s user ID. However, the assumption above is critical. Sometimes, the SCC does not define a range of allowable group IDs but instead requires group ID validation (a result of supplementalGroups set to MustRunAs). Note that this is not the case for the restricted SCC. The project will not likely allow a group ID of 5555, unless the project has been customized to access this NFS export. So, in this scenario, the above pod will fail because its group ID of 5555 is not within the SCC’s or the project’s range of allowed group IDs.

Supplemental Groups and Custom SCCs

To remedy the situation in the previous example, a custom SCC can be created such that:

It is often better to create a new SCC rather than modifying a predefined SCC, or changing the range of allowed IDs in the predefined projects.

The easiest way to create a new SCC is to export an existing SCC and customize the YAML file to meet the requirements of the new SCC. For example:

Here is a fragment of a new SCC named nfs-scc:

When the same pod shown earlier runs against this new SCC (assuming, of course, the pod matches the new SCC), it will start because the group 5555, supplied in the pod definition, is now allowed by the custom SCC.

fsGroup defines a pod’s "file system group" ID, which is added to the container’s supplemental groups. The supplementalGroups ID applies to shared storage, whereas the fsGroup ID is used for block storage.

Block storage, such as Ceph RBD, iSCSI, and various cloud storage, is typically dedicated to a single pod which has requested the block storage volume, either directly or using a PVC. Unlike shared storage, block storage is taken over by a pod, meaning that user and group IDs supplied in the pod definition (or image) are applied to the actual, physical block device. Typically, block storage is not shared.

A fsGroup definition is shown below in the following pod definition fragment:

As with supplementalGroups, all containers in the above pod (assuming the matching SCC or project allows the group 5555) will be members of the group 5555, and will have access to the block volume, regardless of the container’s user ID. If the pod matches the restricted SCC, whose fsGroup strategy is MustRunAs, then the pod will fail to run. However, if the SCC has its fsGroup strategy set to RunAsAny, then any fsGroup ID (including 5555) will be accepted. Note that if the SCC has its fsGroup strategy set to RunAsAny and no fsGroup ID is specified, the "taking over" of the block storage does not occur and permissions may be denied to the pod.

fsGroups and Custom SCCs

To remedy the situation in the previous example, a custom SCC can be created such that:

It is better to create new SCCs versus modifying a predefined SCC, or changing the range of allowed IDs in the predefined projects.

Consider the following fragment of a new SCC definition:

When the pod shown above runs against this new SCC (assuming, of course, the pod matches the new SCC), it will start because the group 5555, supplied in the pod definition, is allowed by the custom SCC. Additionally, the pod will "take over" the block device, so when the block storage is viewed by a process outside of the pod, it will actually have 5555 as its group ID.

A list of volumes supporting block ownership include:

User IDs can be defined in the container image or in the pod definition. In the pod definition, a single user ID can be defined globally to all containers, or specific to individual containers (or both). A user ID is supplied as shown in the pod definition fragment below:

ID 1000100001 in the above is container-specific and matches the owner ID on the export. If the NFS export’s owner ID was 54321, then that number would be used in the pod definition. Specifying securityContext outside of the container definition makes the ID global to all containers in the pod.

Similar to group IDs, user IDs may be validated according to policies set in the SCC and/or project. If the SCC’s runAsUser strategy is set to RunAsAny, then any user ID defined in the pod definition or in the image is allowed.

If, instead, the runAsUser strategy is set to MustRunAsRange, then a supplied user ID will be validated against a range of allowed IDs. If the pod supplies no user ID, then the default ID is set to the minimum value of the range of allowable user IDs.

Returning to the earlier NFS example, the container needs its UID set to 1000100001, which is shown in the pod fragment above. Assuming the default project and the restricted SCC, the pod’s requested user ID of 1000100001 will not be allowed, and therefore the pod will fail. The pod fails because:

To remedy this situation, a new SCC can be created with the appropriate user ID range. A new project could also be created with the appropriate user ID range defined. There are also other, less-preferred options:

User IDs and Custom SCCs

It is good practice to avoid modifying the predefined SCCs if possible. The preferred approach is to create a custom SCC that better fits an organization’s security needs, or create a new project that supports the desired user IDs.

To remedy the situation in the previous example, a custom SCC can be created such that:

For example:

Now, with runAsUser: 1000100001 shown in the previous pod definition fragment, the pod matches the new nfs-scc and is able to run with a UID of 1000100001.

All predefined SCCs, except for the privileged SCC, set the seLinuxContext to MustRunAs. So the SCCs most likely to match a pod’s requirements will force the pod to use an SeLinux policy. The SeLinux policy used by the pod can be defined in the pod itself, in the image, in the SCC, or in the project (which provides the default).

SeLinux labels can be defined in a pod’s securityContext.seLinuxOptions section, and supports user, role, type, and level:

Here are fragments from an SCC and from the default project:

All predefined SCCs, except for the privileged SCC, set the seLinuxContext to MustRunAs. This forces pods to use MCS labels, which can be defined in the pod definition, the image, or provided as a default.

The SCC determines whether or not to require an SeLinux label and can provide a default label. If the seLinuxContext strategy is set to MustRunAs and the pod (or image) does not define a label, OpenShift Container Platform defaults to a label chosen from the SCC itself or from the project.

If seLinuxContext is set to RunAsAny, then no default labels are provided, and the container determines the final label. In the case of Docker, the container will use a unique MCS label, which will not likely match the labeling on existing storage mounts. Volumes which support SeLinux management will be relabeled so that they are accessible by the specified label and, depending on how exclusionary the label is, only that label.

This means two things for unprivileged containers:

For a volume to be accessible by a pod, the pod must have both categories of the volume. So a pod with s0:c1,c2 will be able to access a volume with s0:c1,c2. A volume with s0 will be accessible by all pods.

If pods fail authorization, or if the storage mount is failing due to permissions errors, then there is a possibility that SeLinux enforcement is interfering. One way to check for this is to run:

This examines the log file for AVC (Access Vector Cache) errors.